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Toward a Rational Harvest: The United Nations
Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Species
Mark Christopherson
The food resources of the world's oceans, once thought limit-
less,1 are showing the effects of an unregulated harvest.2 In-
creased fishing of overexploited stocks has resulted in
diminished high seas fisheries world-wide.3 This relative pau-
city of ocean bounty has led to a scramble for remaining re-
sources, which has created inevitable, often violent, conflict on
the open sea.4 As a result, coastal states and other fishing coun-
tries have advocated a new regime of international cooperation.
1. Hugo Grotius, for example, argued in the seventeenth century that one
cannot have a property right in the sea, in part because it is inexhaustible. "For
the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it
cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of
all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries."
HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 28 (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin,
trans., 1916).
2. The United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has re-
ported a steady decline in marine fisheries catches since 1989. Some High Seas
Fisheries Aspects Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, U.N. Food & Agricultural Organization, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1641
INF/4 (1993) [hereinafter High Seas Fisheries Aspects]. Total catches peaked at
86 million metric tons in 1989, and decreased during each of the following three
years to 82.5 million tons in 1992. Id. The increases that did occur in world
catch from 1970 to 1989 are mitigated to some extent, in part because less valu-
able commercial species were exploited as higher value stocks declined. U.N.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER No. 335,
REVIEW OF THE STATE OF WORLD MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES, 7-9 (1994). The
number of countries fishing these stocks also increased by 25%. Id. at 7.
3. High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 9.
4. Nearly 30 separate fishing conflicts arose in 1993 alone. "The catalyst
for the disputes is that the amounts of fish caught appear to be declining in the
past few years, following four decades of explosive growth." Bronwen Maddox,
Fleets Fight in Over-Fished Waters: Fishing Disputes Have Risen Up the Diplo-
matic Agenda, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at 4. Examples of violent conflict in-
dude: the sinking of a Taiwanese vessel suspected of illegal fishing by an
Argentinean gunboat; fishermen's attack on Russian trawler near Scotland -
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On December 4, 1995, the United Nations' General Assem-
bly introduced an international agreement to protect vulnerable
fish stocks (the Agreement). 5 The Agreement implements some
provisions of existing international law and proposes a conserva-
tion scheme to promote rational harvests in high seas fisheries.
It introduces enforcement measures on an unprecedented scale
and attempts to foster new cooperation among fishing nations.
This Note examines the Agreement's effectiveness as a reg-
ulatory scheme. Part I explores the plight of world fisheries and
the unilateral efforts of coastal states to address resource deple-
tion. Part II discusses international attempts to regulate high
seas fisheries. Part III details obligations that the Agreement
imposes. Part IV analyzes the Agreement's effectiveness in light
of past international conservation failures. This Note concludes
that although the Agreement duplicates many aspects of ineffec-
tive regulatory schemes, current modifications will enable it to
guide fishing nations toward more rational harvests.
I. THE FAILURE OF UNILATERAL CONSERVATION
The majority of important fish stocks lie within the jurisdic-
tional waters of coastal states.6 In certain regions, however, fish
stocks "straddle" these jurisdictional lines, thus making a uni-
fied conservation effort difficult. Other species migrate through
jurisdictional areas and into the high seas, 7 where freedom of
fishing has allowed indiscriminate landings by industry fleets.8
Declining catches for all three types of stock have demonstrated
the inefficacy of unilateral preservation efforts.
£250,000 of cod destroyed; on-going violent clashes between China and Taiwan,
with some deaths reported. Id.
5. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Seas of 10 December 1982 Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995) [hereinafter The
Agreement].
6. PETER WEBER, ABANDONED SEAs: REVERSING THE DECLINE OF THE
OcEANs 11-14 (1993) (WorldWatch Paper No. 116.).
7. High Seas include "that portion of ocean which is beyond the territorial
seas of any country." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 502 (6th ed. 1991).
8. See infra part I.C.2.
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A. COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION: THE EXPANSION OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA
At the close of the fifteenth century, many coastal states
had claimed exclusive jurisdiction over surrounding waters. 9 By
the 1700s, their authority generally extended a distance of three
miles offshore, the range a typical cannon shot.10 This common
measure of a state's territorial sea was the general rule until
1945, when the United States declared its intention to create
conservation zones in surrounding areas of high seas.11 While
the declaration was not intended to extend U.S. jurisdiction, it
was widely misinterpreted by other states and precipitated a
number of unilateral extensions. 12 By 1958, sixty-three of the
eighty-six nations participating in the Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea claimed jurisdictions greater than three miles. 13
In 1966, even the United States extended its jurisdiction to
twelve miles off its coasts and prohibited access by some foreign
fishing vessels. 14
Despite the exclusion of foreign fishing in its waters, by
1976 nearly seventy percent of all fish caught off the U.S. coast
were taken by foreign fishermen. 15 In response, Congress estab-
lished a 200 mile Fisheries Conservation Zone (FCZ) which sub-
jected domestic and foreign vessels to U.S. jurisdiction. 16 In
9. FRANCIS CHRISTY & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES: SOME PROBLEMS OF GROWTH AND ECONOMIC ALLOCATION 154-55
(1965). The extent of these claims depended largely on the results of wars or
other conflicts where excessive claims were laid to rest. Id.
10. Id. at 157.
11. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948) (hereinafter Truman
Proclamation).
12. Later commentators insisted that the Truman Proclamation did not
create an extension of jurisdiction, rather, it merely articulated an intent to
negotiate with other nations for the establishment of bilateral conservation
zones. See, e.g., ELDON V.C. GREENBERG, Overview of Ocean Fisheries and Law,
in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 385 (1993).
13. CHRISTY & SCOTT, supra note 9, at 156.
14. Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966)
(repealed 1977). The Act created a nine-mile zone beyond the three mile terri-
torial sea, in which foreign fishing was prohibited without express authoriza-
tion. GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 386.
15. Warren G. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52
WASH. L. REV. 427, 431 (1977). From 1948 to 1973, the United States more
than doubled its consumption of fish and fisheries products, yet U.S. landings
remained relatively constant - 4.3 billion pounds in 1938 to 4.7 billion pounds
in 1973. Id.
16. The Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-57 (1992); 22 U.S.C. §§ 1972-73
(1992). As originally enacted, the Magnuson Act provided that, "[Tihe United
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1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 17 reflected the U.S. extension by adopting a 200 mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).' 8 Consequently, the 200 mile
EEZ is now the international standard.' 9
States shall exercise exclusive fishery management authority, in the manner
provided for in this chapter, over the following: (1) All fish within the fishery
conservation zone.... (3) All Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the
fishery conservation zone." 16 U.S.C. § 1812 (1976). Today the relevant section
reads, "except as provided in section 1812 of this title [now a provision address-
ing highly migratory species] the United States claims, and will exercise in the
manner provided for in this chapter, sovereign rights and exclusive fishery man-
agement authority over all fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources,
within the exclusive economic zone." 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1992) (emphasis added).
While the original Act did not exclude access by foreign fishers, later
amendments created a preference for U.S. vessels. The Processor Preference
Amendment, for example, created a preference for U.S. floating fish processors
over foreign processors within the FCZ. Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519 (1978).
17. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
121 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The Con-
vention capped off fifteen years of work by the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. Id.
The United States continues to operate under the Conventions adopted at
the 1958 Conferences on the Law of the Sea (Geneva Conference). The Conven-
tions establish the right for coastal states to regulate access to the territorial
sea, but in contrast to UNCLOS, the extent of the state's jurisdiction is not
established. The 1958 Conventions include: the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and the
Convention on the Continental Shelf. ELLEN HEY, THE REGIME FOR THE Ex-
PLOITATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE FISHERIES RESOURCES 8-9 (1989). The
Second United Nations Conference was held to determine the outer limit of the
territorial sea but was unsuccessful. Id. at 9.
18. UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 57, at 1280. Within the EEZ, the coastal
state has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil, and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents
and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to:
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Id. at 1280, art. 56.
19. Although the United States has yet to become a party to UNCLOS,
President Reagan changed the FCZ created by the Magnuson Act into an EEZ
in 1983. Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 23 (1983). This had the effect of de-
claring U.S. "sovereignty" over all resources within the zone. GREENBERG,
supra note 12, at 387. Since sovereignty was in effect reserved in the FCZ, this
declaration had little practical impact. Id. at 387 n.90.
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B. PLIGHT OF WORLD FISHERIES GENERALLY
Unfortunately, the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction
did little to mitigate the effects of overfishing. World fisheries
today are severely stressed. All seventeen of the world's major
fishing areas monitored by the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion (FAO) have reached or exceeded their natural limits; nine
are in serious decline. 20 Since 1975, stocks of breeding age At-
lantic bluefin tuna have dropped ninety percent.21 Atlantic cod
populations near the Grand Banks22 have fallen ninety-five per-
cent over the past few years. 23 The Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies Organization (NAFO), which manages ground fish 24 catches
in this area, has stated that the stocks are "in the worst condi-
tion they have ever been."25
In the Pacific, catches of Pollack in the Bering Sea's "Donut
Hole"26 plummeted from nearly 1.4 million metric tons in 1989
to 10,000 metric tons in 1992.27 The numbers of snappers and
groupers in the Gulf of Mexico have declined by eighty-five per-
cent, due at least in part to indiscriminate shrimp harvests. 28
In short, many of the world's traditional fishing stocks now
threaten to drop below levels of viability.29
In response, some coastal nations have closed the endan-
gered fisheries within their jurisdictional waters. Canada has
20. WEBER, supra note 6, at 34.
21. Michael D. Lemonick, Too Few Fish in the Sea: After Reaping the
Oceans' Bounty with Careless Abandon, the World Struggles to Save an Irre-
placeable Food Source, TIME, Apr. 4, 1994, at 70.
22. The Grand Banks lie off the coast of Newfoundland, just outside Cana-
dian jurisdictional waters. See U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER No. 337, WORLD REVIEW OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY
SPECIES AND STRADDLING STOCKS 55 (1994).
23. Lemonick, supra note 21, at 70.
24. Ground fish or "demersal" stocks are those fish with a strong depen-
dence on the bottom of the ocean. U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
supra note 22, at 3.
25. NAFO, quoted in High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 5.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 56 and 57.
27. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Mi-
gratory Fish Stocks, Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk: Letter Submitted by the Delegations
of the Russian Federation and the United States, at 1, para. 3, U.N. Doc A/
CONF. 164/L.33 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks].
28. Emily Smith & William C. Symonds, Not 'So Many Fish in the Sea,'
Bus. WK., July 4, 1994, at 62.
29. In fact, all growth in world catches in the past decade derives from five
"low-value" species not previously exploited for their commercial value. U.N.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 22, at 1.
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prohibited all cod fishing in the Grand Banks.30 In the fall of
1994, the United States closed fishing in the Georges Bank off
the coast of Massachusetts. 31 Russia has imposed a fishing mor-
atorium in the "Peanut Hole" in the Sea of Okhotsk.32 Closing
individual fisheries, however, has done little to curb the decline
of straddling stocks and highly migratory species.
Much of the blame for these dwindling stocks may be traced
to an overcapitalized fishing industry. From 1970 to 1990, the
world's fishing fleet increased twice as fast as marine catches. 33
The United States alone had approximately sixty-four "factory
trawlers" in 1990, accounting for a capital investment of over
$1.1 billion.3 4 Advances in technology such as satellite naviga-
tional systems and sonar, which are used to pinpoint stocks,
have further increased the capacity of the inflated world fleet.35
The flow of capital from government subsidies has also stabi-
lized and helped preserve this vastly inefficient industry.36 This
excessive capital has resulted in a bloated industry: in order to
return to the 1970 rate of catch per vessel, at least thirty percent
of the existing tonnage in the world's fleet would have to be re-
30. Lemonick, supra note 21, at 70. Closing the Grand Banks has put
nearly 30,000 people out of work. Id.
31. A Long-Awaited Fishing Treaty, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, at 8. These
moves have decimated many towns dependent on the fishing industry, which
imposes additional costs to governments in the form of lost tax revenues and
direct aid payments designed to mitigate the economic damage. Massachusetts
Governor William Weld, for example, pledged $10 million in aid after the
Georges Bank closed, and the Federal Commerce Department later announced
an additional $30 million aid package. Lemonick, supra note 21, at 70.
32. Jon K. Goltz, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations
Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack Fishery, 4
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 443, 443 (1995).
33. High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 8.
34. GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 381. A factory trawler is an integrated
fishing and processing/packaging vessel. Often over 350 feet in length, the
trawlers tow large bag-like nets or "trawls" to capture fish at varying depths.
Alternatively, it acts as a processing station for smaller ships that bring in the
catch. For a general description of this method, see JOHN C. SAINSBURY, COM-
MERCIAL FISHING METHODS 25-93, (1986).
35. STEPHEN CUNNINGHAM ET AL., FISHERIES ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION
66 (1985).
36. Total subsidies to fleet operations were estimated at 54 billion U.S. dol-
lars in 1993. "Such subsidies have enabled these fleets to continue operations
when, under normal circumstances, such operations would not have been finan-
cially viable." High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 9.
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moved.3 7 Too many vessels are competing for too few fish, giv-
ing rise to a classic example of "the tragedy of the commons."38
Increased competition has in turn bred violent conflict. In
1994, a Russian gunboat fired on Japanese fishermen.3 9 Later
that year, an Icelandic trawler and Norwegian coast guard ves-
sel exchanged fire.40 In March of 1995, a Spanish fishing vessel,
the ESTAI, was taking Greenland halibut in a high seas area.41
Canada, believing that the vessel was overfishing, arrested the
captain, locked up the crew, and towed the vessel to a Canadian
port.42 The European Union (EU) has called the arrest, which
was pursuant to a controversial Canadian law, an act of interna-
tional piracy.43
C. STRADDLING STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES
Straddling stocks and highly migratory species attract a
disproportionate amount of this intense competition. The bio-
logical distinction between the two may be tenuous at times,44
but the terms are generally useful. Straddling stocks are those
fish stocks which straddle the jurisdictional lines of coastal na-
tions' EEZs. 45 Highly migratory species migrate through high
seas and state EEZs during their life cycle.46
37. Id. Annual operating costs of the world fleet in 1989 exceeded revenues
by 22 billion, without even taking capital outlays into account. U.N. FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 2, at 11.
38. Nations have historically viewed fish stocks as common property,
although recent international regulation has modified this view. An open har-
vest on a common property resource often leads to irrational exploitation of the
resource because no state can be assured that other states will in turn harvest
rationally. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 375.
39. Maddox, supra note 4, at 4.
40. Id.
41. Background Note on EU-Canada Fisheries Relations, THE REUTER ETR.
COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 10, 1995.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. "For example, the Chilean horse mackerel, which straddles 1,500 miles
off the exclusive economic zones of Chile and Peru, is a particular case of a
straddling stock that might, from the biological standpoint, be as highly migra-
tory in nature as some of the smaller tuna listed in the 1982 [Law of the Sea]
Convention." High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 4.
45. Id. at 3. A stock may also straddle two neighboring EEZs.
46. Highly Migratory Species include "9 species of tuna, 12 species of bill-
fish, 2 tuna-like species, 4 species of sauries, pomfrets, dolphin fish, oceanic
sharks and cetaceans." High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 7.
1996] 363
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1. Straddling Stocks
The peculiar geography of straddling stocks makes them es-
pecially susceptible to overfishing. Under the current UNCLOS
regulatory scheme, coastal nations may set allowable catches of
stock in their EEZ.47 If the coastal nation has the capacity to
harvest this amount itself, it may exclude fishing by distant
water fishing nations (DWFNs).48 Consequently, DWFNs often
escape the effects of UNCLOS and coastal state regulation by
harvesting the same fish stocks just outside the EEZ.49 In the
last decade, the proportion of catches taken beyond 200 nautical
miles has doubled. 50 As coastal stocks diminish, DWFN's have
an even greater incentive to exploit high seas stocks. 51
Straddling stocks are distributed throughout the world's
oceans. 52 Some of these fisheries are being harvested within
safe limits, 5 3 but nearly all stocks suffer from a lack of reliable
data both as to the extent of their numbers and the rate at which
they are being harvested. 54 In particular, those straddling
stocks which do not abut continental shelves are poorly
understood.55
International controversy in two of the world's pollack fish-
eries illustrates the problems confronted when political bounda-
ries do not reflect the biological realities of stock habitat. The
"Donut Hole", an area of high seas covering 661,000 square
miles in the Bering sea, yielded a three million ton annual catch
47. UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 62.
48. Id.
49. Jill Vardy, An Uneasy Calm: A Stormy Week of High Seas Manoeuvres
with Spain Closes with Agreement on Broad Principles on Turbot Fishing, but
Brian Tobin is not Letting Down his Guard, FIN. POST, Apr. 1, 1995, at 13.
50. High Seas Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 2. Total marine produc-
tion taken beyond coastal EEZs has increased from five to ten percent. Id.
51. William Emerson, Hitting the High Seas, OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 18,
1995, at 33.
52. In the Atlantic, significant straddling stocks include cod, haddock,
Greenland halibut, oceanic redfish and hakes, among others. High Seas Fisher-
ies Aspects, supra note 2, at 6. In the Pacific, another principal species includes
orange roughy, which requires special care because of its late maturity (20-25
years). Id. at 5.
53. Blue Whiting, for example, saw heavy rates of harvest in the late 1970s
but is now being exploited "within safe biological limits." Id.
54. U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 22, at 10.
55. Id. High seas fish stocks may be described as neritic or oceanic. Id. at
3. Neritic stocks are confined to continental shelf and slope areas, id., while
oceanic stocks live farther out on the "abyssal plain." Id. at 4-5. Oceanic popu-
lations are very diffuse and therefore difficult to study accurately. Id. at 5.
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of pollack for years. 56 High seas fishing of these stocks by Ja-
pan, South Korea, China, Poland and Panama just outside the
U.S. and Russian EEZs reduced this take to only 50,000 tons in
1993. 5 7 In the Sea of Okhotsk, the EEZ of the Russian Federa-
tion completely surrounds an area of high seas dubbed the "Pea-
nut Hole". DWFN exploitation of pollack (a straddling stock) in
the Peanut Hole tempted Russia to extend its jurisdiction be-
yond its EEZ, thus closing off the enclave. 58 Such an extension
would have violated UNCLOS and perhaps set a precedent that
other coastal nations would follow.59 Thus, the geography of
straddling stocks poses a unique challenge to international regu-
latory schemes.
2. Highly Migratory Species
Highly migratory species are often caught on the high seas,
far beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states. 60 Since verification
is difficult, willing states find it easy to misreport catches. 61 The
nations which fish for tuna, for example, rarely report catch sta-
tistics to surveillance organizations such as the FAO.62 Misre-
ported catches often come from vessels which fish under the
authority of foreign countries. 63 Vessels often choose foreign
flags for their permissive regulatory rules and then fish under
them as "flags of convenience."6 4
As with straddling stocks, the current regulatory system for
highly migratory species is largely ineffective. Nations have
fished several of the most commercially valuable species beyond
56. Vardy, supra note 49, at 13. The area of international waters encircled
by the Russian and U.S. EEZs form the hole of the donut.
57. Id.
58. Goltz, supra note 32, at 451. Russia need only extend its jurisdiction by
18 miles to control the entire Sea of Okhotsk. Id. at 450, n.33.
59. Id. at 451. The Russian Federation subsequently imposed a fishing
moratorium of dubious timing and efficacy, as Russian scientists now predict a
collapse of that fishery by 1996. Vardy, supra note 49.
60. The fleets that pursue tunas, for example are "truly international in
character and are highly mobile between fishing grounds." High Seas Fisheries
Aspects, supra note 2, at 7.
61. U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 22, at 24. For
example, in 1991 Panama reported a catch of 17,700 tons for 444 vessels regis-
tered. Id. Venezuela reported 82,800 tons caught for 80 vessels in the same
year. Id.
62. Id. Only five of the top sixteen tuna-catching countries reported catch
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sustainable levels or to depletion. 65 Instead of cooperating to
conserve migratory resources, many coastal states have entered
into irrational licensing agreements with DWFNs which exploit
these species once they are within the coastal nation's EEZ.66
The result, as with straddling stocks, is a declining resource
base.
II. UNCLOS AND THE NEW ERA OF
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
In 1982, the United Nations introduced the.Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which proposed a regulatory and conserva-
tion scheme for the world's oceans. 67 The ratification of UN-
CLOS took over ten years; it finally became effective in
November of 1994.68 Some observers consider UNCLOS to con-
tain "the most comprehensive and progressive international en-
vironmental law of any modern international agreement."69
Under the new regime, all states have an obligation to protect
and preserve the marine environment. 70
UNCLOS specifically addresses the problems associated
with vulnerable fish stocks.71 On the best scientific evidence
available, it directs states to maintain or restore high seas
stocks at levels which will produce the "maximum sustainable
yield."72 Within the EEZ, however, coastal states must observe
the higher standard of "optimum utilization" of living
resources.
73
Two provisions of UNCLOS address the narrow issues of
straddling stocks and highly migratory species. Article 63 di-
rects coastal states and DWFNs to negotiate with one another
over the proper allocation of straddling stocks, both within an
65. Id. Those exploited beyond maximum sustainable levels include north-
ern bluefin in the Mediterranean and albacore in the South Atlantic. High Seas
Fisheries Aspects, supra note 2, at 8. Northern and southern bluefin in the At-
lantic Ocean are considered depleted. Id.
66. Id. at 7.
67. See supra note 17.
68. Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment and the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 IN 'L LAw. 879, 882 (1994).
69. Id.
70. UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 192, at 1308.
71. Id. art. 63-64, at 1281.
72. Id. art. 119(1), at 1290.
73. Id. art. 62(1), at 1281. "Thus, in the EEZ the coastal state has the obli-
gation to manage fisheries to promote the optimum utilization of the living re-
sources by taking into account a wide variety of conservation, environmental,
and economic factors that extend well beyond the mere maximization of the
production of a particular fish stock." Charney, supra note 68.
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EEZ and beyond it.74 Article 64 imposes a duty upon fishing na-
tions to cooperate toward the optimum utilization of highly mi-
gratory species. 75 Thus, with respect to these vulnerable stocks,
UNCLOS envisions an era of international negotiation and coop-
eration in which states come to terms with their respective
needs and the demands of a sensible harvest.
Although requirements such as "international cooperation"
and the "obligation to protect and preserve" are arguably
unenforceably vague, UNCLOS does have settlement provisions
in the event of a dispute. When parties reach an impasse, UN-
CLOS allows for binding arbitration. 76 Any party to a dispute
may request that a tribunal hear a question of interpretation or
application of UNCLOS.77 Where international law requires,
however, parties must first exhaust local remedies. 78
Without supplementation, this enforcement regime may
prove ineffective. UNCLOS does not guarantee any substantive
rights in disputes between coastal states and nations fishing
vulnerable stocks on the high seas. Instead, it demands only
that they reach an agreement and cooperate without providing
any incentives to compel this result. A tribunal may decide that
a fishing nation has violated its obligation to protect and pre-
serve the living resources of the sea, but the vagueness of this
duty in a vacuum of precedent serves as no duty at all.
III. THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY
MIGRATORY SPECIES
UNCLOS fisheries provisions have been bolstered by recent
action at the United Nations. 79 The Agreement for the Conser-
74. UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 63(2), at 1282.
75. Id. art. 64(1), at 1282.
76. Id. part XV § 2, at 1322. See also the many limitations on this proce-
dure. Id. part XV § 3, at 1324.
77. Id. art. 286, at 1322. At the time a state ratifies the Convention, it
indicates its preferred forum for dispute settlement. Id. art. 287(1), at 1322-23.
A signatory may choose from a number of options: the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice or a series of special
tribunals. Id.
78. Id. art. 295, at 1324.
79. The Agreement, supra note 5. The U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks recently submitted the Agreement for
ratification by individual states. 100 Nations Adopt Fishing Treaty to Regulate
Ocean Fishing, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 6, 1995, at 4. The U.N. General Assembly
opened the Agreement for signature on December 4, 1995. To become effective
it will require ratification by at least 30 countries. The Agreement, supra note
5, arts. 37, 40(1).
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vation of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species
proceeds within the legal framework of UNCLOS and imple-
ments the more general fisheries provisions.8 0 It provides a fo-
cused and detailed attempt to address the specific problems
posed by vulnerable stocks. The efficacy of the UNCLOS regime,
however, depends on its ability to administer a more substantive
and enforceable bill of harvesting rights and obligations.
A. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
AGREEMENT
The Agreement resolves "to ensure the long-term conserva-
tion and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly mi-
gratory fish stocks through effective implementation of the
relevant provisions of the Convention [UNCLOS]." 81 Thus the
Agreement is consistent with UNCLOS, functioning as a more
refined means through which the general provisions of UNCLOS
will operate. In fact, the Agreement directly incorporates by ref-
erence provisions of UNCLOS in a number of areas. 82
The Agreement's provisions apply to vessels fishing the high
seas.83 Its overriding purpose is to establish an era of interna-
tional cooperation among high seas vessels and coastal states.8 4
It is not surprising therefore that many of the obligations under
the Agreement are bound up in its elaboration of the term
"cooperation."
The duties of cooperation are described with more specificity
in the Agreement than in UNCLOS. For example, under the
"precautionary approach,"85 states must develop precautionary
"reference points" of two sorts: a limit reference point and a tar-
get reference point.86 A limit reference point identifies the "safe
biological limits within which fish stocks can produce maximum
sustainable yield."8 7 Target reference points are those limits a
80. The Agreement, supra note 5, preamble.
81. Id. art. 2.
82. See, e.g., id. art. 30(3) (incorporating by reference article 287 of UN-
CLOS for purposes of dispute resolution).
83. Id. art. 3(1). Articles 6 and 7 also apply to waters under the jurisdic-
tion of coastal states. Id.
84. See generally id. art. 5 (stating that general principles were imple-
mented with an end toward conserving and managing straddling fish stocks).
85. Id. art. 5(c). See also id. at Annex II.
86. Id. art. 5(c); Annex II, para. 2.
87. Id. "The fishing mortality rate which generates maximum sustainable
yield should be regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points." Id.
at Annex H, para. 7 (emphasis added).
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reasonable management scheme would allow."" States must
take measures to assure that these points are not exceeded.8 9 In
the event that the limits are exceeded, states shall take action to
restore the stocks without delay.90
The duty to cooperate also includes a number of interrelated
provisions that require valid scientific surveys of the stocks. 91 In
order to maintain long-term stability of vulnerable fisheries,
states must "promote and conduct scientific research and de-
velop appropriate technologies in support of fishery conservation
and management."92 Participating states must also keep de-
tailed statistics of total catches by fleet,93 including records of
length, weight, and sex.94 These provisions reflect the belief of
the Conference that competent compilation and analysis of data
is fundamental to conserving and managing vulnerable fish
stocks.95
Finally, the Agreement considers species other than those
with commercial value. States are obligated to minimize the
harvest of non-target species incidentally caught with commer-
cially important fish.96 States must also assess the impact of
activities other than fishing on these non-target stocks.97 The
Agreement specifically calls for actions to protect endangered
species, 98  but limits - these measures "to the extent
practicable." 99
88. The Agreement states only that target or management reference points
are those "intended to meet management objectives". Id. at Annex II, para. 2.
89. Id. art. 6(4).
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 14(1)(a).
92. Id. art. 5(k). See also id. at Annex I (describing the general principles
behind the collection and sharing of data).
93. Id. at Annex I, art. 3(1)(a).
94. Id. at Annex I, art. 3(2)(a).
95. The U.N. Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Spe-
cies believed that in order to give effect to UNCLOS, states must cooperate to-
ward "the effective contribution and timely exchange of scientific information...
in order to ensure that the best scientific evidence available is used for manage-
ment decisions." A Guide to the Issues before the Conference Prepared by the
Chairman, Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164110 (1993).
96. The Agreement, supra note 5 art. 5(f).
97. Id. art. 5(d).
98. Id. art. 5(f).
99. Id.
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B. MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Regional and subregional fisheries management organiza-
tions play primary roles in the Agreement's regulatory
scheme. 100 All parties to the Agreement must either pursue co-
operation through one of these organizations or negotiate di-
rectly with one another to establish conservation and
management programs.' 01 The incentive to gain membership in
an established fisheries organization is great, however, because
only members of such an organization have access to the covered
fishery. 0 2
The organizations will perform many critical functions.
They will establish conservation and management schemes as
members agree on catch limits 10 3 and apply any "international
minimum standards for the responsible conduct of fishing opera-
tions."10 4 The regional organizations will also conduct many of
the scientific evaluations of straddling stocks and migratory spe-
cies and assess the impact of fishery practices on them. 0 5 The
organizations must also act affirmatively to ensure that disputes
among its members are settled peacefully. ' 0 6 The efficacy of the
entire Agreement depends substantially on the ability of the re-
gional organizations to fulfill the role envisioned for them.
100. Examples of regional fisheries organizations include: the Northwest At-
lantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), and the North-East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission (NEAFC). As their names suggest, they have jurisdiction over re-
gional fishing areas, assuming this power through the consent of their mem-
bers. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 35, at 179-96 (describing the
regimes of four regional fisheries organizations).
101. The Agreement, supra note 5, art. 8(1).
102. Id. art. 8(4). A nonmember state may fish in the area covered by such
an organization if it agrees to apply the conservation and management meas-
ures established by the organization. Id. This exception is unlikely to do any
harm to the incentive, because nonmember states will presumably want to af-
fect conservation and management provisions that will apply to it in any event.
Cf id. art. 17(2) (stating that nonmembers of organizations and nonpartici-
pants in the arrangements of the organizations "shall not authorize vessels fly-
ing its flag to engage in fishing operations for the straddling fish stocks or
highly migratory fish stocks which are subject to the conservation and manage-
ment measures.. .).
103. Catch limits or allocations of allowable catches will not be set as a mat-
ter of course but rather will be agreed on "where appropriate." The Agreement,
supra note 5, art. 10(b).
104. Id. art. 10(c).
105. Id. art. 10(d)-(g).
106. Id. art. 10(k).
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C. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Regional fisheries organizations often fail to prevent de-
clines in stocks because of a lack of fundamental enforcement
power. To remedy this, the Agreement provides a number of
unique enforcement provisions. Among the most prominent are
provisions obligating a state to investigate when a party alleges
that one of its flagships has violated a regional conservation
measure. 10 7 Both the accusing state and the regional organiza-
tion are entitled to a report of the progress and outcome of the
investigation.108 Further, the flag state must impose sanctions
severe enough to deter such future conduct. 109
Although these duties may lead to greater cooperation
among fishing states, regulations may only be enforced where
violations are detected. This problem leads to perhaps the most
ambitious of the Agreement's provisions: parties may board and
inspect foreign vessels to ensure compliance with conservation
measures. 10 Boarding parties must report to the flag state any
violations found."' The flag state must then initiate an investi-
gation, or authorize the boarding state to do so itself." 2
When there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has
committed a serious violation, even more stringent measures
may apply. 1 3 If the flag state does not respond appropriately,
the inspectors may secure any and all evidence of the violation
107. Id. art. 19(1)(b).
108. Id. In fact, all states having an interest in the violation have a right to
information on the progress of the investigation. Id. art. 20(3).
109. Id. art. 19(2). The sanctions must be severe enough to deprive the
transgressor of any benefit that might have resulted from the violation. Id.
Where the vessel's master or officers are found to be among the offending par-
ties, the Agreement encourages suspension of their authorizations to serve in
such a capacity. Id.
110. Id. art. 21(1). In fact, the flag state need not be a member of the re-
gional organization whose conservation measures the boarding state wishes to
enforce (as long as it is a party to the agreement). See id. A state party to the
Agreement may board any vessel of a state also party to the Agreement. Id.
These boarding provisions are not completely unique, however. See infra text
accompanying note 128.
111. The Agreement, supra note 5, art. 21(5).
112. Id. art. 21(6).
113. Id. art. 21(11). The Agreement gives a non-exclusive list of violations
that states will recognize as "serious." These include: (1) fishing without a valid
authorization; (2) failure to maintain accurate records or misreporting catches;
(3) fishing in a closed area; (4) fishing for a prohibited stock; (5) using prohibited
gear; (6) falsifying the identification of a vessel; (7) tampering with evidence
relating to an investigation. Id.
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and direct the vessel to the nearest port.114 If the flag state
agrees to take over the investigation, it may simply command
the release of the vessel. 115
The Conferees evidently felt strongly that boarding provi-
sions are necessary for the Agreement's enforceability. Regional
organizations must augment the general freedom to board and
inspect vessels with specific boarding procedures. 116 Unwilling
to wait while states move grudgingly toward this augmentation
(and stocks consequently dwindle), the Agreement forces them
to make a choice: either have such procedures in place within
two years, or they will be provided. 11 7 Many of the details of
these procedures may prove undesirable to states, including the
use of force where appropriate.118 This may act as an impetus
for state involvement and encourage speedy implementation of
boarding procedures.
Despite the mandatory language and default rules provided
in this part of the Agreement, the Conferees allowed regional
organizations to weaken the boarding provisions in some in-
stances. 119 Where the Agreement's obligations are met by some
"alternative mechanism," a regional organization may apply the
boarding provisions solely among its members.' 20 This may un-
dercut the incentive to membership. It is also possible, however,
that the Agreement is allowing a degree of flexibility that will be
needed as the composition and vulnerability of stocks change
over time.
114. Id. art. 21(8). The inspecting state must immediately inform the flag
state of the vessel's port destination. Id. "The inspecting State and the flag
State and, as appropriate, the port State shall take all necessary steps to en-
sure the well-being of the crew regardless of their nationality." Id.
115. Id. art. 21(12). The inspecting state must release the vessel along with
any pertinent information regarding the investigation. Id.
116. Id. art. 21(2).
117. Id. art. 21(3). Article 22 of the Agreement provides procedural guide-
lines for the implementation of the boarding and inspection provisions. Id. art.
22.
118. Id. art. 22(1)(f). Force is appropriate when it is necessary to ensure the
safety of the inspectors. Id. Other important procedural details include the
duty of the vessel master to provide the inspectors with facilities, and allow
inspection of documents, records, equipment, etc. Id. art. 22(2)-(3).
119. Id. art. 21(15).
120. Id.
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE
AGREEMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS
If the Agreement is to breathe any life into UNCLOS, the
regional organizations must provide the resuscitation. The
Agreement relies on these organizations to establish most of the
regional rules, surveillance procedures, and enforcement meas-
ures. The enforceability and effect of the new regime will de-
pend on three factors: (A) states must cooperate through
regional organizations to establish effective rules; (B) regional
organizations must implement monitoring systems to ensure
compliance with local rules; and (C) sanctions must be applied
when violations are detected. If these responsibilities are not
fulfilled, the Agreement's reforms will be effectively neutralized.
A. COOPERATION THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
INDEPENDENT AGREEMENTS
1. Regional and Subregional Organizations
Due to the controversies arising in its area of jurisdiction,
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) has been
extremely visible over the past few years. 12 1 NAFO manages
ten important fish stocks, seven of which straddle the Canadian
EEZ.l2 2 Given its prominent role in attempting to foster cooper-
ation among member states, NAFO illustrates whether reliance
on such organizations will ensure rational harvests.
Under the Agreement, NAFO will perform several regula-
tory functions, including setting total allowable catches for its
member states. 123 NAFO has been setting quotas for years,
however, and has had difficulty enforcing them. For example,
from 1986 to 1992, the EU reported cod catches of five times the
121. NAFO is the successor to the International Commission on Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). Bruce N. Shibles, Implications of an International
Legal Standard for Transboundary Management of Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank
Fisheries Resources, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 3 n.10 (1994). Its members
include Canada, Cuba, the European Economic Community, Norway, Portugal,
Germany, Iceland, Spain, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Denmark, Japan,
Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Id.
122. The straddling stocks include Grand Banks cod, three Grand Banks
flounder, Grand Banks redfish, capelin, and squid. The NAFO high seas stocks
are in an area known as the Flemish Cap and consists of cod, redfish, and
American plaice. NAFO Scientists Agree on Threat to Northern Cod, Canada
NewsWire, June 6, 1992, available in WESTLAW, CanWireplus Database.
123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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NAFO quota. 124 For flounder, it exceeded quotas by a factor of
eighteen. 125 When NAFO prohibited member states from har-
vesting ocean perch in 1991, the EU set a quota of 6,000 tons for
its fleets and reported a total catch of 10,000 tons. 126 Other re-
gional organizations have had similar difficulty gaining the com-
pliance of members with respect to fishing quotas.' 27
NAFO also has boarding provisions similar to those found in
the Agreement. Under the scheme of Joint International Inspec-
tion and Surveillance, any member state may inspect the vessels
of other members. 28 The open sea investigations are followed
by dockside inspections. The apparently tough surveillance pro-
visions in the Agreement, therefore, do not go beyond existing
measures for those states operating in the NAFO regulatory
area.
Many of NAFO's problems stem from its consensual na-
ture. 29 A NAFO decision does not apply to any member that
files an objection to the measure within sixty days.130 The EU,
124. Canadian Fish Stocks Decimated; Canada Itself Shares the Blame; Cod
and Flatfish; Industry Overview, QUICK FROZEN FOODS INT'L, Jan. 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
125. Id.
126. Debora McKenzie, UN Could Step in to Stop Fights Over Fish; Fisher-
ies Disputes in International Waters, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 9, 1993, at 9.
127. In 1993, the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
suggested that Norway and Russia limit their catch of herring to 125,000 tons.
By the end of the year, these two countries had taken 195,000 tons. Id. ICCAT
also reports stock depletion through over-fishing by its members. Maddox,
supra note 4, at 4.
128. Background Note on EU-Canada Fisheries Relations, supra note 41.
The boarding rights have been exercised; in 1994, inspectors boarded EU ves-
sels 430 times on an average of 45 vessels. Id.
129. The Convention under which NAFO operates states:
1. Upon notice of a regulatory proposal by the Fisheries Commission
[of NAFO] ... The proposal shall then become a measure binding on all
Contracting Parties, except those which have presented objections, at
the end of the extended period or periods for objecting...
3. At any time after the expiration of one year from the date on which
a measure enters into force, any Commission member may give to the
Executive Secretary notice of its intention not to be bound by the mea-
sure, and, if that notice is not withdrawn, the measure shall cease to be
binding on that member ....
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
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for example, justifies much of its noncompliance by noting its
timely objection to NAFO quotas. 131
It is unclear how the Agreement will affect this procedural
system. Clearly, enforcement measures will be taken quickly
against a single renegade vessel. 132 When a member state re-
fuses to comply with a local rule, however, it may simply raise
an objection in a timely manner. The state has already fulfilled
its primary obligation under the Agreement by joining a regional
organization. 133 Other member states are then left to litigate
the issue of whether the state has fulfilled its duty to "cooperate"
in conservation and management. 134 But this is precisely where
UNCLOS left things: unenforceably vague.
2. Independent State Cooperation
Instead of joining a regional fisheries organization, states
may fulfill their duty to cooperate by negotiating directly with
other fishing nations. 135 States have always had this power, 136
but the condition of world fisheries demonstrates that they have
exercised it with mixed results.
In 1984, for example, the International Court of Justice de-
fined the maritime boundary between the United States and
Canada in the Gulf of Maine.' 37 Since the demarcation resulted
131. The EU believes that Canada, another NAFO member, has exercised
undue influence on that organization and acted unfairly toward the EU. Back-
ground Note on EU-Canada Fisheries Relations, supra note 41. For example, in
1994, the EU accepted NAFO's decision to limit the take of Greenland halibut
to 27,000 tons. Id. In February of 1995, the EU claimed that Canada forced a
second vote allocating the EU only 3,400 tons, contravening the EU's right to
object. Id. The EU consequently plans on setting an autonomous limit. Id.
132. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
133. The Agreement, supra note 5, art. 8(1).
134. UNCLOS, supra note 17, art. 63-64. Note, however, that article 17 pro-
vides that a state may not allow vessels flying its flag to fish the straddling or
migratory stocks under the jurisdiction of the regional organizations if that
state "is not a participant in a subregional or regional fisheries arrangement,
and which does not otherwise agree to apply the conservation or management
measures established by such an organization." Id. art. 17(1)-(2).
It is difficult to see what this means for organizations such as NAFO. Does
the Agreement effectively alter the constitution of consensual organizations
whose members are all parties to the Agreement? The two must be reconciled
in some manner.
135. Id. art. 8(1).
136. See, e.g., Canada-EU Reach Agreement to Conserve and Protect Strad-
dling Stocks, Canada NewsWire, Apr. 15, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
CanWireplus Database.
137. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the
Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
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in stocks that straddled the two nations' EEZs, many observers
expected the United States and Canada to enter into a new era
of independent cooperation.' 3 3 Instead, seven years passed
before the parties introduced a shared management agree-
ment. 139 The conservation measure came too late, however, and
stock depletion forced the United States to close the Georges
Bank fishery shortly thereafter. 140
In the troubled pollack fisheries, bilateral negotiations have
proved to be ineffectual as well. During the Bering Sea con-
flict, 14 1 the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to
suspend fishing in the EEZs surrounding the high seas Donut
Hole, but vessels from DWFNs fished the area to collapse.' 42
This failure came despite numerous meetings including seven
multilateral conferences. 143 After depleting the Donut Hole
fishery, the DWFNs proceeded to the Sea of Okhotsk and re-
sumed fishing.'44 The Russian Federation initiated negotia-
tions, but declining stocks forced them to issue a general
moratorium. 145 Nonetheless, experts predict the collapse of this
fishery as well. 146
Given the tragic results of recent direct negotiation, this op-
tion is unlikely to promote the Agreement's conservation goals.
Perhaps the Agreement foresees states conferring in anticipa-
tion of future conflict, instead of the ad hoc cooperation that oc-
curs after a fisheries decline is discovered. But again, states
could cooperate directly in the absence of the option. Thus, the
provisions for direct negotiation may serve only to allow an in-
different state to avoid the strictures of a regional organization.
B. DETECTION OF VIOLATIONS
For states that choose to become members of a regional or-
ganization, many enforcement provisions apply. The Agreement
recognizes that its effectiveness depends on the detection of vio-
lations. Member states must therefore "implement and enforce
conservation and management measures through effective mon-
138. Shibles, supra note 121, at 1.
139. Id. at 2.
140. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
142. United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, supra note 27, para. 2-3, at 1.
143. Id. para. 7, at 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Vardy, supra note 49, at 13.
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itoring, control, and surveillance." 147 But the detection scheme
implemented by the Agreement may fail to solve current moni-
toring problems.
The Agreement's boarding provisions, for example, fail to do
more than duplicate ineffective portions of existing schemes.148
DWFNs also have significant financial incentive to thwart
boarding authorities. Coastal nations have often accused
DWFN vessels of concealing excessive catch in false holds.149
Therefore, the effectiveness of boarding surveillance depends
heavily upon the skills of the investigators.
Obviously, regional organizations cannot board a vessel sus-
pected of violating local rules if the whereabouts of the vessel is
unknown. They must know when a vessel enters a closed area
and when it fishes straddling stocks on the high seas. A system
that maps the location of vessels would facilitate conservation
through general deterrence alone.
Since the late 1980s, the United States has used a satellite
monitoring system to locate DWFNs in the North Atlantic.' 50
Each monitored vessel must carry a transmitter which runs off a
shipboard 12-volt battery.15' The satellite sends a signal to a
computer that plots the position of vessels. 152 The system moni-
tored 775 vessels in 1990 to ensure compliance with local restric-
tion; the United States proclaimed it a "huge success." 15
3
The satellite monitoring systems hold a great deal of prom-
ise for troubled fisheries. Unfortunately, such systems are cost
prohibitive for general application.' 54 As this technology ad-
vances, such systems also become quickly obsolete, leading to
greater costs as regional organizations strive to maintain the
best methods of surveillance. For endangered areas such as the
147. The Agreement at art. 5(1). See also id. arts. 10(h), 18(g).
148. See supra text accompanying note 128.
149. See, e.g., EU-Canada: Tensions Rise Again Over Fish in North Atlantic,
EuR. REP., Mar. 29, 1995.
150. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Mi-
gratory Fish Stocks, Monitoring High Seas Vessel Operations by Satellite; Sub-
mitted by the Delegation of the United States, para. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.164/L.17 (1993).
151. Id. para. 7, at 2.
152. There are actually several systems available: the Argos system (de-
scribed above), the International Maritime Satellite Organizations standard -C/
GPS (global positioning system), and HF Radio/GPS. Id. at 2-3, para. 9.
153. Id. para. 5-6, at 2.
154. The United States estimates vessel-tracking-only hardware at $5,000
to $8,000. Estimates for cost of vessel-position reports are $500 to $1000 per
year per vessel. Id. para. 16-17, at 4.
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Sea of Okhotsk, however, such cost-intensive technology may
make the difference between a depleted fishery and a viable one.
C. SANCTIONS
For the Agreement to be effective, parties must utilize ag-
gressive sanctions. When a state detects a violation by a vessel
flying its flag, it must apply sanctions "adequate in severity to be
effective in securing compliance... and shall deprive offenders of
the benefits accruing from their illegal activities."155 Since the
flag state itself ordinarily controls the licensing of such a vessel,
it may revoke or restrict that license. 156 This threat should de-
ter those vessels which do not wish to reflag.
Some violations, however, occur with the express or implied
permission of a flag state. For example, a nation may choose to
disregard the quota allocated by a regional organization. The
EU's disregard of NAFO's quotas illustrates this point.157 The
consensual nature of organizations such as NAFO thus has the
potential to undercut the organization's own sanctions. 58 If a
state objects to a regional organization's rules, however, a party
may apply to a tribunal for relief, such as the International
Court of Justice.' 59 Whether the sanctions available under the
Agreement would be the same as those enforced by the regional
organization is unclear in the Agreement, and has not yet been
resolved by a tribunal. Thus the Agreement's power of deter-
rence is unlikely to be determined for some time.
V. CONCLUSION
The new straddling stocks Agreement solidifies UNCLOS in
a number of important ways. The provisions of the older Law of
the Sea may work well as a general framework, but the fisheries
rights and duties it established are far too vague to be enforcea-
ble. The new Agreement purports to remedy this problem. It
155. The Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 19(2). Sanctions must include pro-
visions which permit "refusal, withdrawal, or suspension of authorizations to
serve as masters or officers on such vessels.' Id.
156. The flag state does give up some autonomy with respect to licensing
when it signs the agreement. "Measures to be taken by a State in respect of
vessels flying its flag shall include: (a) control of such vessels on the high seas
by means of fishing licenses, authorizations or permits, in accordance with any
applicable procedures agreed at the subregional, regional or global level . .
Id. at art. 18(3).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
159. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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utilizes regional and subregional organizations that are charged
with creating the substance of international fisheries law. The
effectiveness of the organizations will determine the efficacy of
the Agreement as a whole.
Although the regional organizations have developed some
successful conservation schemes, they have also had some note-
worthy failures. Quotas have been allocated and routinely ig-
nored. The consensual nature of these organizations lies at the
heart of this problem, since members are often permitted to ob-
ject and ignore the organization's regulations.
At best, the Agreement guides fishing states methodically
toward conservation and management of rapidly diminishing
fish stocks. The focus on regional organizations, despite its
shortcomings, provides the flexibility necessary to confront the
needs of each fishery. Strict adherence to enforcement mecha-
nisms will lend the Agreement a credibility unique in this area.
Finally, the weakening influence of the consensual procedure
must be reduced or eliminated. Only then may the regional or-
ganizations direct their members toward a rational harvest of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species.
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